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The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal For a
Constitutionally Apportioned Wealth Tax
by JOHN T. PLECNIK*
Introduction
"Eat the poor children," proposes Jonathan Swift.'
"Nay," protests Occupy Wall Street, "Eat the rich!"2
Although separated by nearly three centuries and three thousand
miles of ocean, Mr. Swift's Modest Proposal and the colorful signs
and slogans of Occupy Wall Street evoke concern for precisely the
same issue of distributive justice. Of course, neither proposal is
serious. Both are more than arguably an exercise in Juvenalian
satire.3 But they raise serious issues that require equally serious
solutions. Among those, how do we distribute the tax burden in a
fair, pragmatic, and constitutional way? This Article's modest
proposal for the New Flat Tax is a fiscally responsible solution. And
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. B.A., Belmont Abbey College, 2003; J.D., Duke University School of Law,
2006; LL.M. in Taxation, New York University School of Law, 2009. I thank David
Barnhizer, Patricia Falk, Browne Lewis, Allen Madison, Kevin O'Neill, Mark Sundahl,
and James Wilson. I am also grateful to Richard Schmalbeck for helpful discussions on
the subject matter of this Article. Lastly, I thank my research assistant Nathan Genovese,
and the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, especially Dustin Ingraham.
Any errors in this Article are my own, and the conclusions do not necessarily represent
the views of any other individual.
1. JONATHAN SwIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING THE CHILDREN OF
POOR PEOPLE IN IRELAND, FROM BEING A BURDEN ON THEIR PARENTS OR COUNTRY,
AND FOR MAKING THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLICK (1729).
2. Noemi de la Torre, Wacky Signs From Occupy Wall Street, ABC NEWS (Oct. 14,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/10/wacky-signs-from-occupy-wall-street/.
3. Juvenalian satire "inspires indignation through the mordant portrayal of human
venality and cruelty." James A. McKenna, Law Making: The Framers of the Constitution
Were Our First Postmodernists (Or Why Justice Scalia Is Wrong), 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 71,
86 n.49 (1999) (citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 110-11(1995)).
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it is truly modest. This Article does not propose eating the rich with
draconically high taxes. It merely proposes a tax system that
distinguishes between the rich, middle class, and poor, and taxes them
according to their societal benefit and ability to pay. Specifically, this
Article outlines a constitutional method for imposing a simple, flat
rate wealth tax as a supplement to the income tax.
Uncle Sam has three nieces: Paula, Mandy, and Wanda. The
nieces are identical triplets, and even Uncle Sam has trouble telling
them apart. In other words, he has trouble identifying a difference
principle to distinguish between them. Paula, Mandy, and Wanda all
have jet black hair, hate mayonnaise, and love to dance. But that is
where their similarities end. After the three nieces left college, Paula
Poor fell on hard times. Instead of majoring in accounting,
engineering, or some other practical subject, she studied the
"Philosophy of Star Trek" and quite literally majored in "Evil."'
Currently an underemployed barista at Starbucks, Paula has no wealth
to speak of income of $25,000, and consumption of $25,000.
Her sister Mandy Middleclass was smart enough to study
ventilation, and owns a relatively successful air conditioner repair
business. However, margins are tight and Mandy finds that she is
rarely able to save or invest. As a result, she has no preexisting wealth,
income of $45,000, and consumption of $25,000.
Wanda Wealthy began college as a computer science major, but
quickly dropped out to create a social networking website known as
MyFace. Much to everyone's chagrin, people do enjoy posting what
they ate for lunch online and looking at one another's embarrassing
photos. Wanda became an overnight billionaire. Much like Mark
Zuckerberg, Wanda only pays herself a nominal salary,' and she is as
4. On a list produced by the compensation research firm PayScale, based on data from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, engineering majors took the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth
slots. Jenna Goudreau, The 15 Most Valuable College Majors, FORBES (May 15, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jennagoudreau/2012/05/15/best-top-most-valuable-college-majors-
degrees/.
5. Georgetown University, Course Catalog-The Philosophy of Star Trek, available at
http://courses.georgetown.edulindex.cfm?Action=View&CourselD=PHIL-180 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2013). Brittany Geragotelis, Majoring in "Evil," BRITTANY THE BOOK SLAYER
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://brittanythebookslayer.blogspot.com/2010/09/majoring-in-evil.html
(A recent, viral Internet story involved a student taking a self-directed study program at
NYU Gallatin who chose to major in "Evil." Naturally, the story ends with the student
going on to become a lawyer.).
6. Zachary M. Seward, Mark Zuckerberg joins the $1 salary club, QUARTZ (Apr. 27,
2013), http://qz.com/78979/mark-zuckerberg-joins-the-1-salary-club/.
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stingy and frugal as Scrooge himself' As a result, she has wealth of
$20 billion, income of $45,000, and consumption of $25,000.
In all honesty, which of the three nieces is best off? Looking
through this reverse veil of ignorance,' if you will, which of the three
nieces would you prefer to be? All other things being equal,9 a
rational actor would prefer the economic position of Wanda to that of
Mandy, and Mandy to that of Paula. Stated otherwise, most of us
would prefer the lot of the rich to the poor.'o However, not every
type of tax system recognizes and reflects this intuitively obvious fact.
A consumption tax would treat each of the three nieces exactly the
same, ignoring Mandy's greater income and Wanda's vastly greater
wealth. Even an income tax would treat Mandy and Wanda the same,
ignoring Wanda's billions.
The consumption and income taxes suffer from tunnel vision.
They ignore preexisting wealth,n no matter how great. Even $20
billion goes under the radar. In a world where preexisting wealth is
often many, many times greater than consumption or income,12 this is
an unacceptable oversight. To say that the poor, middle class, and
wealthy should all pay the same or similar tax bill is nothing short of
absurd. It fails the most venerable balancing test of all time: the
laugh test." Only a wealth tax distinguishes between each of the
triplets and their unique economic positions. Only a wealth tax
reaches the result that we intuit to be correct. The wealthy-those
who derive the greatest benefit from society, and in turn, have the
greatest ability to pay-should pay more than the poor and middle
class. Simply put, it is the fairest result.
7. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (1st ed. 1843).
8. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1st ed. 1971).
9. And since our hypothetical Paula, Mandy, and Wanda are identical triplets, all
other things are equal.
10. The vaudevillian Sophie Tucker famously quipped, "I've been rich and I've been
poor. Believe me, honey, rich is better." Ronald Bailey, More Money, More Happiness:
More research on the economics of happiness, REASON.COM (May 3, 2013), http://reason.
com/archives/2013/05/03/more-money-more-happiness.
11. See, e.g., Daniel Altman, Editorial: To Reduce Inequality, Tax Wealth, Not
Income, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,2012, at A21; MARK B. SAWICKI, ECON. POLICY INST., THE
PRESIDENT'S TAX REFORM PANEL 6 (2005), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/
bpl69/ (consumption tax ignores preexisting wealth).
12. Altman, supra note 11, at A21.
13. United States Supreme Court Justices have thrice cited the proverbial "laugh
test" to label an argument or position as frivolous or wholly without merit. Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 493 (2004); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Const.
Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 231 (1999).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Moreover, it is the pragmatic and necessary result. The current
federal income tax system raises insufficient revenue to maintain our
military-industrial complex and social welfare state.14 The United
States has experienced year after year of multibillion dollar deficits
with projections of trillions more to come." As President Barack
Obama and countless others have noted, spending cuts are necessary
to address the budget deficit." However, unless we are willing to
return the size of government to colonial levels, cuts alone are not
enough. If we continue to demand the current level of government
services and programs or anything close to it, a responsible approach
to balancing the budget must involve revenue increases -hence the
call for new and higher taxes. From President Ronald Reagan18 to
Speaker John Boehner," Republicans have famously called for
lowering the rates and broadening the tax base to raise more revenue.
They just might be right. However, broadening the tax base by
pulling in greater numbers of poor and middle class taxpayers will not
have an appreciable effect on revenue or the budget deficit. Instead,
we must broaden the tax base to include the greatest and most
obvious new source of revenue-namely, the tens of trillions of
dollars of preexisting wealth in the United States.20
14. The budget deficit was $1.089 trillion in 2012, and is projected to grow to $6.958
trillion in 2023. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 4649, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2013 TO 2023 at 9, tbl. 1-1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Jeff Mason, Obama says U.S. can't afford more showdowns over debt,
deficits, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/05/usa-fiscal-
obama-idUSL1E9C50SG20130105 ("Spending cuts must be balanced with more reforms
to our tax code."); Sam Youngman & Erik Wasson, Obama defends $3.7T budget; deep
cuts needed 'to walk the walk'. THE HILL (Feb. 14, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-
money/budget/143845-obama-defends-37t-budget.
17. Mason, supra note 16.
18. William A. Niskanen, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Reaganomics,
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/Reaganomics.html (last visited Mar. 6,2014).
19. MSNBC.com Staff and News Service Reports, Obama to GOP on Debt Deal:
Let's Go!, NBC NEWS.COM (July 12, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43708826/ns/
politics-white house/tlobama-gop-debt-deal-lets-go#.UQFlZOr6YTQ (House Speaker
John Boehner noting that the way to increase tax revenue is to "[B1roaden the tax base
and lower (tax) rates. As (Florida) Sen. (Marco) Rubio said last week 'we don't need
more taxes, what we need are more taxpayers."').
20. The United Nations estimated that the total wealth of the United States equaled
$117,832,867,000,000 in 2008. UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY - INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
DIMENSIONS PROGRAMME ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, INCLUSIVE
WEALTH REPORT 2012, at 329, available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/IWR_2012.pdf.
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Fair and necessary perhaps, but is a wealth tax constitutional?
Under the Taxing and Spending Clause, Congress has the power to
"lay and collect Taxes." 2' However, this power is subject to two rules,
namely, Uniformity and Apportionment.2 2 Indirect taxes must be
uniform among the several states, whereas direct taxes must be
apportioned so that states pay in proportion to their population.
Under mainstream jurisprudence, recently confirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,23 better known as the Obamacare decision, a wealth tax is
almost certainly a direct tax. Hence, it must comply with the rule of
Apportionment.
Determining the amount of wealth tax due from a given state
based on its population, rather than its collective net worth, would
result in different rates in different states. Specifically, states with
larger and poorer populations would suffer the highest rates, and
states with smaller and wealthier populations would pay the least.
Before long, all the wealthiest taxpayers would make like a
corporation and move to Delaware.24 This result is unfair and
politically absurd. Thus, many commentators have observed that
wealth taxes are "impossible" to administer in the United States.25
For decades, commentators have also called for a constitutional
amendment to abolish the Apportionment Clause.26 Others have
argued that the Clause is a dead letter.27 Still more have come up with
creative arguments to circumvent the Clause." This Article is the first
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
22. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
23. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
24. For a myriad of reasons, more than half of the corporations in the Fortune 500
are incorporated in Delaware. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, WHY
CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/
whycorporations web.pdf. An apportioned wealth tax with no modifications would create
a strong incentive for wealthy taxpayers to migrate to smaller, wealthier states, like
Delaware, in order to take advantage of lower tax rates.
25. See, e.g., DEBORAH A. GEIER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 91-92 (forthcoming 2014) ("A wealth tax is not
administratively possible at the Federal level because it would be a direct tax that would
be impossible to apportion across the states according to population."); JOSEPH M.
DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXES ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: LAW AND PLANNING 22
(1st ed. 2011) ("Since apportionment of a wealth tax according to population is not
feasible (unless the states were assessed directly by the federal government), a federal
wealth tax has never gotten beyond the state of abstract discussion.").
26. Dwight W. Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1910).
27. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
Spring 20141 THE NEW FLAT TAX 487
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
to propose a solution that complies with the Clause without imposing
different rates in different states.
In Part II, this Article discusses the practical and administrative
issues with implementing a wealth tax in the United States as well as
the substantive fairness of such a tax relative to income and
consumption tax regimes. In Part III, this Article describes the
Apportionment Clause, so-called direct taxes, and the constitutional
issues with implementing a wealth tax. It also describes prior
proposals to circumvent the Apportionment Clause for the sake of a
wealth tax. Part IV outlines this Article's modest proposal to pass the
New Flat Tax-a wealth tax that complies with the dual strictures of
horizontal equity and the constitutional rule of Apportionment.
Under the proposal, the federal government would collect a wealth
tax at a uniform rate and retain each state's apportioned share of the
tax. The excess unapportioned share, if any, would be returned to the
state of origin via a state-level "pick up" tax.29 This revenue sharing
arrangement ensures a uniform state and federal tax burden without
redistributing wealth among the various states. Thus, equity is
achieved and both the letter and spirit of the Apportionment Clause
are satisfied.
I. A Pragmatic and Fair Wealth Tax
If you and I truly are the same, we should pay the same taxes.
Anything else would be intuitively unfair. Horizontal equity demands
that similarly situated taxpayers be taxed the same or similarly,30
whereas vertical equity demands that differently situated taxpayers be
taxed differently." These fairness norms are uncontroversial and
widely accepted by scholars and taxpayers alike. However, selecting
the difference principle, i.e, the parameter used to determine
sameness or difference-i.e., the tax base-is a different story. The
principles of horizontal and vertical equity are fairly critiqued for
failing "to provide a substantive criterion for determining sameness"
29. Prior to the elimination of the § 2011 credit for state death taxes, the estate tax in
most states was known as a "'pick-up' tax because it picked up the amount left by the
federal credit." Jason Ornduff, The Illinois Estate Tax - One Year Later, 18 CHI. BAR
ASS'N REC. 28,29 (2004). Similarly, a state-level wealth tax in this context may be called a
"pick up" tax because it picks up the excess unapportioned share left by the federal wealth
tax.
30. Joseph J. Cordes, Horizontal Equity, in ENCY. TAX & TAX POLICY. 195-96 (1st
ed. 1999).
31. Id. at 195.
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or difference.32 Instinctively, we know that tax liabilities should not
be determined randomly by lottery33 or arbitrarily by whim or bias.
No one is in favor of determining tax liabilities by roll of the dice or
giving unlimited discretion to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
However, the revelation that taxes should be fair as opposed to
random or arbitrary does nothing to answer the question of what is, in
fact, fair. ' To answer that question, we must look to other norms for
substance.
A. A Pragmatic Wealth Tax
First and foremost, any tax system must function pragmatically,
in that, it must (1) raise sufficient revenue (2) in an administratively
feasible way." A tax system or government that fails to do so cannot
survive, and other norms relating to fairness become, for lack of a
better word, academic.
1. Sufficient Revenue
Given the current level of military and social welfare
expenditures" by the United States, "[t]here are, realistically
speaking, three tax base candidates capable of raising" sufficient
revenue: consumption, income, and wealth.37 Therefore, pragmatic
concerns narrow our question to whether a federal consumption,
income, or wealth tax is the fairest alternative.
32. Id. at 195-96.
33. A tax lottery would be little more appealing to contestants than a ritualized
stoning. See Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, NEW YORKER, June 26, 1948, at 25-28 (In
Jackson's classic story, townspeople participate in an annual lottery in which the "winner"
is stoned to death.).
34. To further illustrate the dilemma, virtually no one disagrees with President
Barack Obama's repeated refrain that everyone should pay their "fair share" in taxes.
However, there is much disagreement as to what is substantively fair. See, e.g., Jim Angle,
Republicans dispute Obama's 'fair share' claims, say top earners already pay enough, Fox
NEWS.COM (July 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/11/obama-camp-
focuses-on-answering-what-fair-share-taxes-looks-likel.
35. Greg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1024 n.147 (2005) ("Tax policy is concerned with raising
revenue efficiently and fairly in an administratively feasible manner.").
36. United States Military Spending was $621.1 billion in 2008, $668.6 billion in 2009,
$698.2 billion in 2010, and $711.4 billion in 2011. The World Bank, Data-Military
Expenditure (Current LCU), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.
XPND.CN (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
37. Tariffs and other external revenue taxes-once the primary source of revenue for
the fledgling United States-simply cannot raise sufficient revenue to finance a modern
Westernized government.
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a. Consumption
A consumption tax system taxes consumption," but ignores
increases in wealth (a significant component of income) and
preexisting wealth. Thus, consumption taxes, such as a sales or value
added tax ("VAT"), would treat Paula Poor, Mandy Middleclass, and
Wanda Wealthy exactly the same. Each of the three nieces has
consumption of $25,000, and would pay tax on that amount
irrespective of their varying income and wealth levels. For example, a
10% sales tax would cost each of the nieces $2,500.39
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Economic Affairs, Americans collectively consumed $10.71 trillion in
2011.0 A 10% consumption tax on that amount (assuming no tax
gap41) would have raised $1.07 trillion.
b. Income
A Haig-Simons42 income tax system taxes (i) consumption and
(ii) increases in wealth (i.e., income), but ignores preexisting wealth.43
Thus, income taxes would distinguish between Paula Poor and her
38. Consumption is generally defined as "the total spending by individuals or a
nation, on consumer goods during a given period." PAUL A. SAMUELSSON & WILLIAM
D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 853 (15th ed. 1995). Amounts spent on commercial goods,
bonds, equities, land, precious metals, etc., are better viewed as part of savings and
investment or wealth.
39. Assuming that all of the three nieces' consumption was subject to the sales tax, they
would each owe $2,500 of tax on their consumption of $25,000. 10% x $25,000 = $2,500.
40. Table 2.4.5: Personal Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product, BUREAU
OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/
iTable.cfm?reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=70 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
41. The tax gap is the amount of tax liability owed by taxpayers that is not paid on
time. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-
Gap (last visited Mar. 6, 2014); Dave Rifkin, A Primer on the "Tax Gap" and
Methodologies for Reducing it, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 377 (2009) ("The 'tax gap'
represents the annual amount of 'noncompliance' with the Code.").
42. German legal scholar Georg von Schanz is generally credited as the first to
advocate that the proper measure of economic income is the sum of an individual's
consumption and change in wealth. Georg Schanz, Der Einkommensbegriff und die
Einkommensteuergesetze, FINANZ-ARCHIV, no. 1, 1896 at 1. However, his theory of
income is best known as the Haig-Simons definition of income, because it was developed
and popularized by American economists Robert M. Haig and Henry C. Simons in the
1920s and 1930s. See ROBERT MURRAY HAIG ET AL., THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
(Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE
DEFINITION OF INCOME As A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY (1938).
43. Most income tax systems, like the current federal income tax system, indirectly
tax consumption by disallowing deductions for personal and familial expenditures. 26
U.S.C. § 262(a) (2012).
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two sisters, because Paula Poor has approximately half of their
income. However, they would not distinguish between Mandy
Middleclass and Wanda Wealthy, who each consume and earn the
same amount. For example, a 10% income tax would cost Paula
$2,500, Mandy $4,500, and Wanda $4,500."
However, it is important to note that the current federal income
tax is only a rough approximation of a Haig-Simons income tax. It
departs from the Haig-Simons definition of income in several
significant ways for reasons of public policy and administrative
convenience. Of these departures, the Realization Principle, which
defers taxing the appreciation in property until the property is sold or
exchanged,45 is arguably the most significant. As Professor Deborah
Schenk has noted, this deferral allows the wealthy to defer or
altogether avoid income tax on capital gains and income.46 Since
capital income constitutes the lion's share of increases in wealth,
removing it from the tax base leaves little more than consumption to
be taxed.47 With respect to the wealthy, the current federal income
tax more closely approximates a consumption tax than the Haig-
Simons definition of income.
To illustrate Professor Schenk's point, look to the case of Mark
Zuckerberg, who founded Facebook in the early 2000s. Initially, the
44. A Haig-Simons income tax taxes consumption plus change in wealth. Paula has
$25,000 of consumption and no change in wealth, so her tax base is $25,000 and her tax
liability is $2,500. 10% x $25,000 = $2,500. Mandy and Wanda each have $25,000 of
consumption and (because they only consumed $25,000 of their $45,000 income) a $20,000
increase in wealth, so they each have a tax base of $45,000 and a tax liability of $4,500.
10% x $45,000 = $4,500. The current federal income tax system taxes all of one's nominal
income and indirectly tax consumption by disallowing deductions for personal and familial
expenditures. As a result, Paula would pay no tax under the current federal income tax
system, because she has no nominal income. 10% x $0 = $0. However, the current federal
income tax system would reach the same result as a Haig-Simons income tax as to Mandy
and Wanda by taxing all $45,000 of their nominal income for the year and disallowing
deductions for their $25,000 of personal and familial consumption. 10% x $45,000
$4,500.
45. See 26 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2012) ("[T]he entire amount of the gain or loss,
determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized.").
See also John Thomas Plecnik, Abolish the Inflation Tax on the Poor & Middle Class, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 925, 938 (2011).
46. Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax With a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX. L. REV.
423, 424 (2000). See also Anna Bernasek, Looking Beyond Income, to a Tax on Wealth,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/business/yourtaxes/a-
wealth-tax-would-look-beyond-income.html?_r=0 ("'A wealth tax is an attempt to fill the
holes in income tax,' said Douglas A. Shackelford, a tax expert at the University of North
Carolina. 'The primary hole is unrealized capital gains. That's behind the big buildup of
dynastic wealth."').
47. Schenk, supra note 46, at 425.
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basis and fair market value of Mark's Facebook stock are both zero.
Less than ten years later when Facebook goes public, Mark's basis is
still zero, but the value is now $20 billion. At this point, Mark wants
to buy a private island, a yacht, and a Biarritz blue BMW F 650 GS
dual sport motorcycle.48 To raise the money, he could sell the stock
and realize a taxable gain of $20 billion, but instead, he chooses to
borrow against it. Under the borrowing exclusion, loan proceeds-no
matter how large-are never includable in gross income and subject
to tax.49 When Mark dies holding the stock, the basis is stepped up to
its fair market value of $20 billion under § 1014,0 and his heirs may
sell the stock with no income tax consequences. Just as Professor
Schenk observed, Mark has effectively earned and enjoyed the use of
$20 billion of capital income without paying a dime of income tax."
Moreover, Mark is compensated almost exclusively through capital
income, so he has no appreciable wages on which to pay income tax.52
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Economic Affairs, Americans collectively earned $12.98 trillion of
income in 2011. A flat 10% income tax on that amount (assuming no
tax gap53) would have raised $1.29 trillion. Note that a flat 10%
48. Paul Caron, What Tax Profs Are Thankful For, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 24, 2011),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2011/11/what-tax-profs.html ("John Plecnik
(Cleveland State): 'I am thankful for my old tax profs, including Richard Schmalbeck,
Walter Nunnallee, Mitchell Gans, Brookes Billman, and Leo Schmolka. I am thankful for
my new colleagues at Cleveland State, including Debby Geier and Craig Boise. And I am
thankful for my BMW F 650 GS."').
49. See Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and
Dominion and Control: Applying the "Claim of Right Doctrine" to Found Objects,
Including Record-Setting Baseballs, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 719-20 (2000) ("The best
rationale for the borrowing 'exclusion' derives from financial analysis: in an arms-length
borrowing, the amount borrowed is equal to the present value of the obligation to pay
both principal and interest.").
50. Section 1014 generally provides that "the basis of property in the hands of a
person acquiring the property from a decedent ... shall ... be ... the fair market value of
the property at the date of the decedent's death." Although § 1014 is a two-way ratchet,
with the potential to step down the basis of built-in-loss property and step up the basis of
built-in-gain property, well-advised taxpayers will sell built-in-loss property prior to death
in order to avoid losing their basis, and retain only built-in-gain property to increase their
basis for their beneficiaries or heirs. As a result, § 1014 is commonly referred to as the
"step up" in basis provision.
51. David S. Miller, The Zuckerberg Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/the-zuckerberg-tax.html?r=0.
52. In fact, Facebook pays Mark the nominal salary of $1 as of 2013. See supra note 6.
53. The tax gap is the amount of tax liability owed by a taxpayer that is not paid on
time. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-
Gap (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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income tax raises only 21% more revenue than a flat 10%
consumption tax utilizing statistics from the same federal agency for
the same year. This numerical convergence empirically demonstrates
Professor Schenk's point that the wealthy can and do avoid the
income tax on capital income. To the extent that Mark Zuckerberg
should pay tax on his $20 billion the same way that a janitor pays tax
on his $20,000, a wealth tax may, in fact, be necessary to close the
deferral and § 1014 loopholes.54
c. Wealth
In a very real sense, a wealth tax has the broadest tax base: (1) It
indirectly taxes consumption by taxing the means through which
goods and services are purchased; (2) it indirectly taxes increases in
wealth, by taxing the greater store of wealth those increases create;
and (3) it directly taxes preexisting wealth. Consumption (and even
income) are only an indirect, and hence, imperfect measure of a
taxpayer's societal benefits or ability to pay. Either measure might be
a sufficiently accurate proxy for the poor and middle class, such as
Paula and Mandy, who consume all or a majority of their income and
have modest or no wealth." However, both measures fall flat with
respect to the so-called "1%"" or wealthy who tend to spend far less
than they earn 7 and earn far less than they own." The majority of
their benefit or ability to pay-namely preexisting wealth-is
excluded from the narrow bases of the consumption and income
taxes. In contrast, wealth is a direct measure of a taxpayer's
economic position.
54. See generally Boris Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71
MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1973).
55. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") has
noted consumption taxation as a potential factor in the growing gap between the haves
and have-nots in countries like the United States. Mark Pearson, Michael Forster, and
Marco Mira D'Ercole, Are we Growing More Unequal? OECD (Oct. 2008), at 6, available
at http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/41494435.pdf (hereinafter OECD).
56. The term, "the 1%," was popularized by the Occupy Wall Street protest
movement, and refers to the wealthiest 1% of Americans. See Blaine G. Saito, Building a
Better America: Tax Expenditure Reform and the Case of State and Local Government
Bonds and Build America Bonds, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 577,593 (2013) ("The talk of
Occupy Wall Street (OWS) has some hints of Rawls's theoretical ideas with its focuses on
the inequities of the top 1% of the population getting all the benefits of the growing
economy while the lower 99% stagnate or slip away.").
57. See OECD, supra note 55.
58. Id.
Spring 2014]
THE NEW FLAT TAX 493
Since a wealth tax does indeed have the broadest base, it can
raise the most revenue at the lowest and least oppressive rates. Over
a decade ago, Donald Trump proposed a one-time wealth tax of
14.25% on the net worth of individuals and trusts worth $10 million
or more." Even as a one-shot tax on the uber-wealthy with a low
rate,' Trump's modest proposal was slated to raise over $5.7 trillion
and eliminate the national debt and deficit in one fell swoop.
Imagine the revenue that a periodic or annual wealth tax could raise.
According to the United Nations, Americans collectively owned
$117.8 trillion of preexisting wealth in 2008. A flat 10% wealth tax on
that amount (assuming no tax gap6 2) would have raised $11.7 trillion.
Note that a wealth tax would raise roughly ten times the revenue of a
consumption or income tax at the same rate.
2. Administrative Feasibility
However, any proposal for a new wealth tax must respond to the
longstanding critique that wealth taxes are impossible or
impracticable to administer in the United States. 3 It is certainly true
that the annual valuation of a taxpayer's wealth is potentially
invasive, expensive, and time consuming." However, these legitimate
concerns can be allayed through the use of simplifying assumptions
and valuation rules. Wealth taxes have an ancient heritage. From the
Athenian Elders65 to America's Founding Fathers, governments have
59. DONALD TRUMP, THE AMERICA WE DESERVE (2000).
60. This proposed rate is less than half of the top marginal income tax rate, and even
falls beneath the preferential rates for capital gains and dividends for tax year 2014.
61. Id.
62. The tax gap is the amount of tax liability owed by a taxpayer that is not paid on
time. Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-
Gap (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
63. Mathew J. Franck, The Constitutional Problem of a Wealth Tax, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE (Nov. 19,2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/333660/constitutional
-fiasco-wealth-tax-matthew-j-franck.
64. Id.
65. The Athenian tax system has been described as the "quintessence of 'progressive'
taxation." EDWARD E. COHEN, ATHENIAN ECONOMY & SOCIETY 194. In ancient
Athens, most taxes were a function of wealth. Id. at 194-201. The wealthiest citizens paid
liturgy taxes, which obligated them to finance various government functions, such as the
maintenance of a particular warship, and eisphora taxes, which were a form of property
tax to finance specific undertakings such as a naval campaign. Id. The Athenians
continuously identified their wealthiest citizens via a process known as antidosis, which
literally means "a giving in exchange." S.C. TODD, SELECTIONS BY MICHAEL DE BRAUW,
edition of Mar. 16, 2003, A GLOSSARY OF ATHENIAN LEGAL TERMS 5, available at http://
www.stoa.org/projects/demos/article-1aw--glossary?page=5&greekEncoding. A taxpayer
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successfully imposed wealth taxes for thousands of years. In fact, our
state and local governments continue to do so through a wide variety
of property taxes. Millennia of experience teach us that wealth taxes
are administratively feasible.
a. Periodic Appraisals or Valuations
"The oftener [valuations or appraisals] are made, the greater will
be the expense; the seldomer they are made, the greater will be the
inequality, and injustice."" When faced with the question of
valuation, taxing authorities must always navigate between the Scylla
and Charybdis" of expense and inaccuracy. Frequent valuations can
be costly and inefficient, and infrequent valuations can be outdated
and unfair. However, to the extent that annual valuations of net
worth are currently impossible or impracticable in the United States,
less frequent valuations are a pragmatic solution. Much like real
property is only appraised periodically for purposes of most state and
local property taxes, a taxpayer's wealth need only be appraised
periodically-say once every five years-for purposes of a federal
wealth tax. The resulting inaccuracy from outdated valuations could
be chocked up to administrative convenience and ignored, or dealt
with through an administrative appeals process for taxpayers who are
unsatisfied with the tax value associated with their net worth.
b. Periodic Imposition of Tax
If periodic valuations coupled with an annual wealth tax are
unsatisfactory, both the valuation and imposition of tax could be
imposed on a less frequent basis with a higher rate.6 For example,
who was nominated to pay the liturgy and eisphora taxes could avoid them "if he could
name another citizen who was richer and better qualified to perform the task. Id. If the
man challenged agreed that he was richer, he had to take over the liturgy; if he claimed to
be poorer, then the challenger could insist on an exchange of all their property to test the
claim-in which case the challenger would himself perform the liturgy as the new owner of
the (putatively) greater estate." Id.
66. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 179 (1796).
67. The modem saying "between Scylla and Charybdis" derives from Greek
mythology and refers to a choice between two "dreadful" alternatives. Jamie Darin
Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson's Choice Model for Religious
Accommodation, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 514 n.10 (2006). In Greek mythology, Scylla and
Charybdis were two monsters who resided on either side of a narrow passage of water. Id.
Sailors attempting to pass had no choice but to sail near one of the beasts. Id.
68. As noted above, Donald Trump proposed a one-time wealth tax. See supra note
59 and accompanying text. Such a proposal is certainly administratively feasible. The
relatively successful administration of the estate tax under Internal Revenue Code § 2001
has proven that valuation of a taxpayer's net worth is possible at least once a lifetime.
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instead of imposing an annual wealth tax with a 10% rate, one could
impose a triennial wealth tax with a 30% rate and raise roughly the
same revenue.
If lumping multiyear tax liabilities into one year is problematic,
due to liquidity 9 or other concerns, the tax liability could be due in
three installments-one each year. Looking back to Wanda Wealthy
from the Introduction, instead of valuing her $20 billion net worth
three times and charging her 10% or $2 billion of that amount per
year, she could be assessed 30% or $6 billion every three years and be
required to pay one third of that amount or $2 billion per year. Due
to fluctuations in value, it is unlikely that the numbers would come
out so precisely the same in real life, but this example does illustrate
the relative equivalence of the two approaches.
c. Simplifying Assumptions
In addition to periodic, rather than annual, valuations and
impositions of tax, administrative convenience can be achieved by
applying various simplifying assumptions to a wealth tax. First and
foremost, valuing the net worth of every taxpayer, whether they be
poor, middle class, or wealthy, would be an expensive and absurd
task. Many would have negligible or negative net worths on which no
appreciable amount of tax is due.70 In their case, the cost of valuation
would exceed the revenue raised, and violate the pragmatic norms.
Thus, a minimum threshold or net worth must be set to trigger the
imposition of a wealth tax. This Article proposes that this minimum
threshold should accord with the current amount (whatever it might
be71) of the inflation-adjusted exemption equivalent72 of the unified
With other simplifying assumptions, and by limiting a wealth tax to the super wealthy, a
decennial, biennial, or even annual wealth tax is more than doable.
69. Liquidity is defined as "the quality or state of being readily convertible to cash"
or "the characteristic of having enough units in the market that large transactions can
occur without substantial price variations." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1215 (9th ed.
2009).
70. Susan Tompor, Many households have a negative net worth, study finds, USA
TODAY (May 11, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfilbasics/story/2012-05-
12/households-net-worth-university-of-michigan/54912016/1.
71. The inflation-adjusted exemption equivalent for tax year 2014 is $5,340,000. Rev.
Proc. 2013-35. In the past decade, the exemption amount has been in flux. The
exemption amount rose from $675,000 in 2001 to $3,500,000 in 2009 under the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act ("EGTRRA") of 2001. Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, H.R. 1836, 107th Cong. § 901(a) (2001). The estate tax was
temporarily abolished in 2010, and consequently, there was no exemption amount for that
year. Id. However, EGTRRA was temporary, and sunsetted at the end of 2010. In
response, Congress passed the Tax Relief Act of 2010, which first set the exemption
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credit for federal estate and gift tax purposes. The unified credit73
(and accompanying generation skipping transfer tax exemption74)
allows an individual to transfer a specified amount free of any wealth
transfer tax by gift, bequest, or inheritance. Since the primary
purpose of the wealth transfer taxes (aside from revenue raising) is to
break up intergenerational concentrations of wealth, presumably the
unified credit amount reflects Congress' best judgment as to what
amount of wealth is fair and reasonable to hold tax free, even
unproductively, for one's own use. In tax year 2014, this would
exempt the first $5.34 million of net worth ($10.68 million in the case
of a married couple) from wealth taxation." Based on the
administration of the estate tax, this would limit the imposition of the
wealth tax to less than 1% of the population."
Second, many valuation shortcuts could be used to lower the cost
and controversy of appraising a taxpayer's net worth. For example,
the IRS could use state and local real property valuations rather than
duplicating that effort with their own. The IRS could also assign
preset values to various types of property, such as furnishings for
personal residences and vacation homes.
amount at $5 million and indexed it for inflation. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, & Job Creation Act of 2010, H.R. 4853, 111th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (2010).
However, that Act was also temporary and sunsetted at the end of 2012. Id. The
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, signed into law on January 1, 2013, permanently
set the exemption amount at $5,000,000 subject to inflation adjustments. With those
adjustments, the exemption amount is $5,340,000 for 2014. Although predicting
congressional action is rightly compared to astrology and crystal ball gazing, the
exemption amount is unlikely to change dramatically in the near future.
72. The exemption equivalent of the unified credit is the dollar amount of value in
the estate or gift that is effectively exempt from tax as a result of the credit against tax.
Stated otherwise, it is the dollar amount of property that you can pass free of estate or gift
tax as a result of the unified credit. For example, the inflation-adjusted unified credit for
tax year 2014 is $2,081,800 which effectively exempts the first $5,340,000 of an estate or
gift from tax.
73. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2012).
74. 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (2012).
75. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
76. "Today, only the estates of the wealthiest 0.14% of Americans-fewer than 2 out
of every 1,000 people who die--owe any estate tax whatsoever because of the high
exemption amount, which has more than quadrupled since 2001." Chye-Ching Huang &
Nathaniel Frentz, Myths and Realities About the Estate Tax (rev. Aug. 29, 2013), available
at http://www.cbpp.org/files/estatetaxmyths.pdf.
77. A rate of $X per square foot of residence and vacation home could be assessed
for personal furnishings.
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B. A Fair Wealth Tax
Intuition aside, what is substantively fair? Four competing
fairness norms are commonly advanced to answer this question, and
each originates from a different philosophy of government. The four
norms of tax justice are the: (1) equal sacrifice norm, (2) benefit
norm, (3) standard of living norm, and (4) ability to pay norm.
Ultimately, the equal sacrifice norm justifies head taxes, the standard
of living norm justifies consumption taxes, and the benefit and ability
to pay norms are best read to justify wealth taxes.
1. Equal Sacrifice
The equal sacrifice norm holds that burdens should be shared
equally and "would tax people in equal absolute dollar amounts." 9 It
derives from the idea "that the proper role of government is limited
to securing equal rights under the law.""' Since everyone benefits
equally, everyone should pay equally." The so-called "capitation,"
"poll," or "head taxes" reflect the equal sacrifice norm, as they charge
an equal amount per head or taxpayer.82 For example, under an
annual $100 head tax, our three taxpayers, Paula, Mandy, and Wanda,
would each pay $100 irrespective of their consumption, income, or
wealth. However, recall that Paula already consumes 100% of her
income. Perhaps she could afford to cut back $100 and pay the head
tax, but her predicament illustrates why head taxes are not used in the
United States. They violate the chief pragmatic norm." Namely, they
cannot raise sufficient revenue." A head tax that is high enough to
cover the budget is consequently too high for the poor and middle
class to afford." However, a head tax that is low enough for them to
afford is consequently too low to cover the budget." Today, the U.S.
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Affairs reports that
78. JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE,
AND POLICY 123-27 (3d ed. 2004); Joseph M. Dodge, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth
Transfers: Where Do We Go After ER TA?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 738, 744-45 (1982); Steve
R. Johnson, Unfinished Business on the Taxpayer Rights Agenda: Achieving Fairness in
Transferee Liability Cases, 19 VA. TAX REV. 403, 414-15 (2000).
79. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 78, at 123.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 123-24.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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there are nearly 317.3 million people in the United States." Our
annual budget is approximately $3.5 trillion.' Every man, woman,
and child would have to pay a head tax of nearly $12,000 a year to
cover the budget.89 Large families would face six figure tax bills each
year-for example, a mother and father with seven children would
face an annual tax bill of $108,000. It goes without saying that these
amounts are prohibitively high for the poor and virtually all of the
middle class-many of whom lack even subsistence-level income, let
alone the excess income to pay any amount of tax. The numbers
simply do not add up. As a result, we must conclude that head taxes
and the equal sacrifice norm must be ruled out-not as a matter of
fairness, but as a matter of pragmatism.
2. Benefit
The benefit norm holds that burdens should parallel benefits and
would tax people "in proportion to the varying benefits they receive
from government."" It derives from the idea that "tax payments
serve as the quid pro quo for receiving government services."91
Viewed narrowly, the benefit norm is easily conflated with the equal
sacrifice norm." The government promises the same rights to each
taxpayer, and so, the quid pro quo or tax for that promise should be
the same for everyone as well.93 Head taxes reflect this narrow
conception of the benefit norm, as they charge an equal amount per
head or taxpayer.94 However, as noted above, head taxes cannot raise
sufficient revenue, and this conception of the benefit norm is
impossible to implement.95
Viewed more expansively, the benefit norm would catalogue
actual government benefits received and present the taxpayer with an
87. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Census Bureau Projects U.S. Population of 317.3
Million on New Year's Day, COMMERCE.GOV (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.commerce.gov/
blog/2013/12/30/census-bureau-projects-us-population-3173-million-new-year's-day.
88. The United States expended $3.538 trillion in 2012, and is projected to expend
$3.553 trillion in 2013. Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal
Years 2013 to 2023, at 3 tbl. 1, available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/attachments/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf.
89. $3.5 trillion / 300 million = $12,000 (rounded up to the nearest thousand).
90. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 78, at 124.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 123-25.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
Sprinp, 20141 499THE NEW FLAT TAX
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
itemized bill for them." This view "is hard to implement" for three
reasons: (1) direct government benefits, such as use of highways or
police services, are hard to value; (2) direct government benefits to
some taxpayers, such as good public schools, can create indirect
government benefits to other taxpayers, such as higher property
values and less crime, which are still harder to value; and (3) the norm
of paying for any and all government benefits is inconsistent with the
notion of government welfare and subsidies, which are generally
transferred to those with no ability to pay for them." A straight-up
quid pro quo tax, structured like an itemized bill for services rendered
would reflect this conception of the benefit norm." However, such a
system would prove administratively complex and would require
abandoning all social welfare programs.' Although not impossible to
implement, it is incompatible with our current society and system of
government.'0
The most expansive view of the benefit norm is perhaps the most
useful.o' Rather than measure benefit according to promised or
actual government benefits, it would measure benefit "in terms of the
taxpayer's total dollars earned through utilizing the infrastructure"
created by our "regulated capitalist system."'a Under the expansive
benefit norm, benefit equals wealth. 03 This view holds that wealth is
not created in a vacuum)? It is created within a government system
and, in part, because of that system. Thus, benefit, for which taxes
must be paid as a quid pro quo, must be measured according to
wealth.' Wealth taxes,'0 quite obviously, reflect this conception of
the benefit norm, as they place a toll charge on wealth itself.
President Barack Obama's now famous "you didn't build that"
remark is one of the clearest and most succinct statements of the
expansive benefit norm: "[L]ook, if you've been successful, you didn't
96. Id. at 124-25.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Wealth transfer taxes also arguably reflect this conception of the benefit norm.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2501, 2601 (2012).
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get there on your own.... Somebody helped to create this
unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to
thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you've got a
business, you didn't build that. Somebody else made that happen."a
Senator and Professor Elizabeth Warren similarly asserted that
"there is nobody in this country who got rich on his own."1as
107. Here is the full context of President Obama's now famous "you didn't build
that" remark:
We've already made a trillion dollars' worth of cuts. We can make
some more cuts in programs that don't work, and make government
work more efficiently ... We can make another trillion or trillion-
two, and what we then do is ask for the wealthy to pay a little bit
more....
There are a lot of wealthy, successful Americans who agree with
me, because they want to give something back. They know they
didn't ... look, if you've been successful, you didn't get there on your
own. You didn't get there on your own. I'm always struck by people
who think, well, it must be because I was just so smart. There are a lot
of smart people out there. It must be because I worked harder than
everybody else. Let me tell you something-there are a whole bunch
of hardworking people out there.
If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some
help. There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody
helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that
allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If
you've got a business. you didn't build that. Somebody else made that
happen. The Internet didn't get invented on its own. Government
research created the Internet so that all the companies could make
money off the Internet.
The point is, is that when we succeed, we succeed because of our
individual initiative, but also because we do things together. There are
some things, just like fighting fires, we don't do on our own. I mean,
imagine if everybody had their own fire service. That would be a hard
way to organize fighting fires.
So we say to ourselves, ever since the founding of this country, you
know what, there are some things we do better together. That's how
we funded the GI Bill. That's how we created the middle class. That's
how we built the Golden Gate Bridge or the Hoover Dam. That's how
we invented the Internet. That's how we sent a man to the moon. We
rise or fall together as one nation and as one people, and that's the
reason I'm running for president-because I still believe in that idea.
You're not on your own, we're in this together."
Jake Tapper, Did Obama Say, 'If You've Got a Business, You Didn't Build That'?, ABC
NEWS (July 16, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/did-obama-say-if-youve-
got-a-business-you-didnt-build-that/.
108. Lucy Madison, Elizabeth Warren: "There is nobody in this country who got rich
on his own", CBS NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), www.cbsnews.com/news/elizabeth-warren-there-
is-nobody-in-this-country-who-got-rich-on-his-own/.
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However, this concept is not without controversy. The "We
Built It" slogan of the 2012 Republican National Convention was one
of many repudiations of President Obama's endorsement of the
expansive benefit norm.'" In addition, the norm is counterintuitive
because it flies in the face of conventional wisdom that "welfare
queens" benefit from government services whereas the wealthy pay
for them.no In this line of thought, the poor are the main, if not
exclusive, consumers of government benefits. Moreover, the recent
and marked increase in the use of food stamps, unemployment
benefits, welfare, and other government transfer payments has only
reinforced this traditional view."
However, the traditional view is blind to the totality of
government services as well as their end user. Who makes greater
use of police and fire services? Is it the average Jane with a house on
the corner, or Warren Buffett with billions of tangible and intangible
assets that need constant protection from thieves and the elements?
Who makes greater use of the interstate highway system? Is it the
average Joe on his daily commute, or Meg Whitman with a company
that ships billions in goods across those highways every year? Who
makes greater use of public education? Is it the average Jane
attending Cleveland State University, or Bill Gates who hires
thousands of public school graduates to remake Windows every year?
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Hewlett-Packard Company, and Microsoft
Corporation are only possible in a regulated capitalist economy like
that of the United States. Without legal protections, public goods,
and an educated workforce, none of these corporations could exist.
Nor would the vast stores of private wealth they create.
Redistribution of wealth is not occurring when Buffet, Whitman, and
Gates pay their taxes to finance the government benefits their
companies and wealth depend on. They are merely paying their tab.
109. Hendrik Hertzberg, "We Built It," NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/onlinelblogs/hendrikhertzberg/2012/08/we-built-it.html.
110. Randy Albelda, Fallacies of Welfare-to-Work Policies, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 66, 74 (2001) ("Led by Ronald Reagan and Charles Murray in the 1980s,
women on welfare were given the title of welfare queen.").
111. Some reports show total welfare spending topping $1 trillion in 2011. See, e.g.,
Jim Kouri, Welfare under Obama White House hits $1 trillion, claims report,
EXAMINER.COM (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/welfare-under-obama-
white-house-hits-1-trillion-claims-report.
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3. Standard of Living
The standard of living norm holds that burdens should
correspond to standard of living and "would tax people according to
[that standard], as evidenced by their level of personal
consumption."" 2 It derives from the Hobbesian notion "that citizens
should contribute to government according to what they 'take out' of
society.""' The more one consumes or takes out of society, the more
one should pay."4 Not surprisingly, then, consumption taxes reflect
the standard of living norm, as they place a toll charge on
consumption."' However, not all saving is virtuous and there are
benefits to possessing wealth beyond the future ability to expend it,
such as prestige and power."' Therefore, the standard of living norm,
which ignores the utility of wealth, is deficient."'
4. Ability to Pay
The ability to pay norm holds that burdens should correspond to
ability and would tax people "according to the economic resources
under their control."" 8 It derives from the idea "that taxes, being a
contribution of material resources to government, should be based on
the respective material resources of individuals, measured
objectively."" 9 Stated otherwise, those who can pay more should pay
more.'20 Scholars oft-noted that a Haig-Simons income tax better
reflects the ability to pay norm than consumption taxes, because it
encompasses not only consumption but also increases in wealth.
However, neither income nor consumption taxes encompass
preexisting wealth, which undoubtedly represents a greater ability to
pay taxes. Much like the expansive benefit norm, the ability to pay
norm is best reflected by wealth taxes.
112. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 78, at 125.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 125-26.
115. Id.
116. See Dodge, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers, supra note 78, at 745
("People, however, may save, as well as consume, for selfish motives. Saving is not
equivalent to an act of charity that deserves a reward based upon good intentions."); id. at
745 n.41 ("Savings . .. involves present security, power, and personal satisfaction.").
117. Id.
118. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 78, at 126.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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II. A Constitutionally Apportioned Wealth Tax
The taxing power of the United States is limited, inter alia, by the
Apportionment Clause, which requires "direct taxes" to be
apportioned by population. From the Founding Fathers to today, the
definition of direct taxes has never been clear. However, under the
Obamacare decision, certain categories of taxes, including wealth
taxes, are almost certainly within the scope of direct taxes. To avoid
the application of the Apportionment Clause to wealth taxes, some
commentators have argued that the Clause is a dead letter, and others
have sought to circumnavigate the Clause with arguments of form
over substance.
A. The Taxing Power and the Apportionment Clause
"Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that
'the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted' to
the Federal Government 'is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist."'l 2' The United
States is a constitutional government of limited powers. For Congress
to pass a law or impose a tax, there must be a constitutional basis for
it to do so. A wealth tax is no different from any other, and any
proposal to impose such a tax must comply with the Constitution.
This concern is far from speculative. Today, tax protestors contest
virtually every line of the Internal Revenue Code on constitutional
grounds. Organized political groups habitually relitigate major
legislative battles in the U.S. Supreme Court. Something as
controversial as a new, federal wealth tax would almost assuredly
come before the Nine for adjudication.
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Taxing and Spending Clause, Congress has
the authority to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises
to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States."12  However, Congress' power to lay
taxes is subject to two rules, namely, Uniformity and Apportionment.
The last portion of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, otherwise known as
the Uniformity Clause, explains that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."123 "This uniformity
121. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
123. Id.
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requirement has been construed by the courts to prohibit only patent
or intentional discrimination based on geography."12 4 For example, a
tax that applied only to Texans, but not to the residents of the other
49 states, would violate the Uniformity Clause. However, a tax that
disproportionately applied to Texans, such as a tax on oil and gas
income, but theoretically applied to the residents of every state,
satisfies the Clause.125
The rule of Apportionment derives from two clauses. Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3, otherwise known as the Representation Clause,
provides that "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several states which may be included within this union,
according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons." Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4, otherwise
known as the Apportionment Clause, provides that "No capitation, or
other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration herein before directed to be taken." The rule of
Apportionment applies whenever the rule of Uniformity does not,
and vice versa. Thus, so-called direct taxes, which explicitly include
capitation taxes, are subject to the Apportionment Clause, and all
other taxes, traditionally labeled as indirect taxes, are subject to the
Uniformity Clause. A 10% wealth tax on every taxpayer, regardless
of their state of domicile, is uniform by definition. Thus, there is only
a constitutional problem if that tax is a so-called direct tax and subject
to the rule of Apportionment by population. "[Direct or indirect],
that is the question."126
1. A Brief History of the Apportionment Clause
The history of the Apportionment Clause is fraught with
inconsistencies and scholars hotly dispute its origins, purpose, and
meaning. This Article does not attempt to resolve that dispute.
Rather, this Article will outline the uncontroversial facts about the
Apportionment Clause as a backdrop for its proposal for a
constitutional wealth tax that complies with the rule of
Apportionment.
124. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 846 (2009).
125. See id.
126. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act III, scene I, 1. 65 (A. R. Braunmuller ed.,
Penguin Books, rev. ed. 2001).
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It is uncontroverted that the principal reason for adopting the
Constitution in lieu of the old Articles of Confederation was to
enhance the taxing power of the federal government.127 Under the
Confederation, the federal government was restricted to raising
revenue by requisition from its various member states, which could
and often did refuse to comply.1 2 Financing the Revolutionary War
by these means was impossible, and the so-called Federalists banded
together to support a Constitution with a greater taxing power.129
However, the origins of the Apportionment Clause are less clear.
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Calvin H. Johnson attribute the
Apportionment Clause to a compromise over slavery.30 The South
wanted slaves to count toward population for purposes of
representation in Congress to enhance their political power."' The
North wanted slaves to count toward population for purposes of
Apportionment and taxation to increase the South's tax bill.132
Professor Dodge counters that "[t]he principle of apportionment was
not generated by the institution of slavery."'33 Rather, in his view,
apportionment was the default rule under the Articles of
Confederation, and inertia allowed that default rule to survive, in a
limited way, in the new Constitution.'1
127. See, e.g., Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment
Under the Constitution?, supra note 124, at 848; Letter from Henry Lee to George
Washington (Feb. 16, 1786), in W. W. ABBOT & DOROTHY TwOHIG, III THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 560-61 (1992) (discussing the
necessity of more tax money).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4
(1999) ("This essay attempts a precautionary survey of the fascinating twists and turns of
two centuries-trying hard, at the same time, to avoid missing the forest for the trees. My
story begins with the tainted origins of the 'direct tax' clauses. They do not represent an
independent judgment about the proper system for direct taxation, but were part and
parcel of a larger compromise over slavery at the Philadelphia Convention. Quite simply,
the South would get three-fifths of its slaves counted for purposes of representation in the
House and the Electoral College, if it was willing to pay an extra three-fifths of taxes that
could be reasonably linked to overall population."); Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the
Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295,
296 (2004) ("[A]pportionment of tax was brought into the Constitution to impose a
disincentive on slavery.").
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Dodge, supra note 124, at 855.
134. Id. at 854. Professor Dodge also attributes apportionment to "a realization that
requisitions could create conflict between the federal government and the states, and ... a
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2. Definition of Direct Taxes
The constitutional definition of the term "direct tax" was unclear
"[e]ven when the Direct Tax Clause was written."135 James Madison
and Alexander Hamilton famously clashed over the meaning of direct
taxes in the Hylton case."' Madison claimed that the carriage tax of
1794 was an unapportioned direct tax, and Hamilton objected that
direct taxes are limited to head and real property taxes.' The
Supreme Court sided with Hamilton, and limited the term "direct
tax" to taxes that are reasonably capable of apportionment without
"inequality and injustice.""3 However, the Supreme Court essentially
overruled Hylton in the Pollock cases in which it expanded the term
to include income and personal property taxes.3 9
Much ink has been spilled over the centuries debating the precise
constitutional definition of direct taxes. This Article humbly demurs
from that debate, and instead, focuses on the narrower question of
whether a wealth tax is a direct tax subject to apportionment by
population. In answering that question, it helps to query: What
definitively is a direct tax? Under the majority opinion in the recent
Obamacare decision, the recognized categories of direct taxes are: (1)
head taxes, (2) real property taxes, and (3) personal property taxes.140
Given that real and personal property taxes are recognized as direct
taxes, it would be a Herculean stretch to say that wealth taxes
imposed on the excess of real and personal property over liabilities
are indirect.14 Even prior to the Obamacare decision, most
commentators assumed that wealth taxes are direct.42 In its wake,
there is little, if any, room for doubt. In all likelihood, wealth taxes
are direct taxes, and short of a constitutional amendment, they must
comply with the Apportionment Clause.
growing awareness that apportionment would not work for certain non-requisition taxes."
Id.
135. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012).
136. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 179 (1796).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895).
140. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598-99.
141. Although the argument has been made.
142. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 25, at 22 ("[A] federal wealth tax in the U.S. is
considered by most commentators to be a 'direct tax' that would be unconstitutional
unless apportioned among the states in accordance with population."); Dodge, supra note
78, at 753 ("an annual wealth tax would probably violate the United States Constitution").
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B. Proposals to Circumvent Apportionment
To date, calls for a constitutional wealth tax have come in two
forms. First, some scholars argue that the Apportionment Clause is
not a constitutional roadblock to an unapportioned wealth tax
because expansive interpretations of the clause were implicitly
overruled and are no longer good law. Second, other scholars have
proposed to reframe an unconstitutional, unapportioned wealth tax as
a constitutional income or wealth transfer tax.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment and Hylton Trump Pollock
In essence, Professors Ackerman and Johnson claim that the
Apportionment Clause was a horse trade between the North and the
slave states-a horse trade that is completely irrelevant in light of the
Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery.143 Professor Ackerman
goes so far as to say that the Thirteenth Amendment implicitly
repealed the Apportionment Clause," whereas Professor Johnson
argues that the Sixteenth Amendment and case law on excise taxes
reversed the Pollock decisions and restored Hylton to the status of
controlling precedent.'45 These views clash with a conventional,
textbook approach to interpreting Apportionment Clause
jurisprudence.'" Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have
rejected any proposition that the Apportionment Clause or the
Pollock decisions are a dead letter in the recent Obamacare
decision. 47 In that case, Chief Justice John Roberts and a bare
majority of the Supreme Court cited the Pollock decisions
143. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
144. Ackerman, supra note 130, at 58 ("[T]his original understanding [of the
Apportionment Clause] must be revised in the light of the Civil War. Given the
Reconstruction Amendments, there is no longer a constitutional point in enforcing a
lapsed bargain with the slave power. The express condemnation of 'Capitation' taxes
should be respected, but no others-not even a classical tax on land-should any longer be
considered 'direct' for constitutional purposes.").
145. Johnson, supra note 130, at 298-99 ("It is time now to overrule Pollock in full and
to return to Hylton. Pollock can be and has been contained by manipulative definition of
'excise tax' or 'income' so that the case is avoidable in every instance. Pollock is dead on
its holding as to the income tax. Indeed, courts have a duty to distinguish Pollock in every
case. Apportionment is too awful a requirement to enforce. Since Pollock should never
apply, it should be overruled outright.").
146. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 842-43.
147. This case runs contrary to Professor Johnson's speculation that the Supreme
Court would overrule Pollock given the chance. See supra note 145 and accompanying
text.
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approvingly to conclude that the shared responsibility payment148
under the Affordable Care Act is not a direct tax.' 9 Moreover,
Justice Scalia and the dissenters implied that they might interpret the
Apportionment Clause and the term "direct tax" even more
expansively than the majority.5 o
2. Professor Schenk's Income Tax on the Risk-Free Return of Wealth
Professor Deborah Schenk proposed reframing a wealth tax as
an income tax on the risk-free return of wealth."' However, she
concedes that "the Supreme Court might see this reformulation as a
mere semantic change that does not cure the constitutional infirmity
of a wealth tax."'52 Stated otherwise, Professor Schenk's proposal is
admittedly vulnerable to substance over form15 or a related
doctrine.'54
3. Professor Dodge's Proxy Wealth Tax
Professor Joseph Dodge proposed reframing a wealth tax as a
wealth transfer tax."' Much like Professor Schenk's proposal,
Professor Dodge's proposal is vulnerable to substance over form or a
related doctrine to the extent that it approximates a wealth tax.'
148. The shared responsibility payment is better known to laymen as the individual
mandate.
149. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598-99 (2012).
150. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2655 (2012) ("Finally, we
must observe that rewriting §5000A as a tax in order to sustain its constitutionality would
force us to confront a difficult constitutional question: whether this is a direct tax that must
be apportioned among the States according to their population. Art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Perhaps
it is not (we have no need to address the point); but the meaning of the Direct Tax Clause
is famously unclear, and its application here is a question of first impression that deserves
more thoughtful consideration than the lick-and-a-promise accorded by the Government
and its supporters.").
151. Schenk, supra note 46.
152. Id. at 441-42.
153. See Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-
Form Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 699, 701 (2003) ("Under the
substance-over-form doctrines, courts are permitted to ignore or disregard the text of the
Internal Revenue Code on the basis of economic principles or taxpayer motivation or
both.").
154. Professor Dodge has also concluded that redubbing an ad valorem property tax
or personal wealth tax as an income tax would fail constitutional scrutiny because the
taxes "are not the same in substance." See Dodge, supra note 124, at 932-34.
155. Dodge, supra note 78, at 760-68 (proposing a "proxy wealth tax").
156. Specifically, Professor Dodge proposes a wealth transfer tax that is keyed to the
holding period of assets. Id. The longer an asset is held, the more tax is due on transfer.
Id. One might argue that this tax is different in substance from a wealth tax, and thus
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HI. A Modest Proposal For A Constitutionally
Apportioned Wealth Tax
A wealth tax is pragmatic and fair. It may even be necessary to
plug the ballooning deficit. If only it were constitutional. Attempts to
read the Apportionment Clause out of the Constitution ala Hylton or
the Thirteenth Amendment appear futile in the wake of the
Obamacare decision. Proposals to reframe an unconstitutional
wealth tax as a constitutional income or wealth transfer tax are
admittedly vulnerable to substance over form. How then can we
implement the benefit and ability to pay norms and achieve true
horizontal equity in our tax policy, while complying with the chief
pragmatic norm of raising sufficient revenue? The answer is simple.
Rather than ignore or evade the Apportionment Clause, comply with
it.
Under this Article's modest proposal, the federal government
would collect a wealth tax at a uniform rate and retain the
constitutionally apportioned share of the tax. The excess
unapportioned share, if any, would be returned to the state of origin
via a state-level "pick up" tax. This revenue-sharing arrangement
complies with the Apportionment Clause, because the federal
government never retains more than its constitutionally apportioned
share. It also complies with the bedrock principle of horizontal equity
by ensuring a uniform state and federal tax burden.
A. The Mechanics of Complying with Apportionment by Population
Issues of valuation and administrative convenience aside, the
main bar to implementing a wealth tax in the United States has been
the Apportionment Clause' of the Constitution, which requires so-
called "direct taxes" to be apportioned equally among the states
according to their respective populations. To illustrate, if 10% of the
nation lives in Ohio, and 10% lives in New York, the Apportionment
Clause requires Ohioans and New Yorkers to collectively pay the
same amount (i.e., 10%) of any direct tax-even if Ohioans possess
half the wealth of New Yorkers. This results in twice as high an
effective wealth tax rate on Ohioans than New Yorkers, precisely
because Ohioans are poorer than New Yorkers. This is an absurd
constitutional. See id. However, to the extent that is true, the proposal fails to achieve a
true proxy for a wealth tax. See id.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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result-unfair in practice and politically infeasible. As such, Congress
has largely avoided all forms of direct taxation."'
B. Calculating a Constitutionally Apportioned Wealth Tax
In the controversial (and landmark) Pollock decisions,' the
Supreme Court held that taxes on real and personal property are
direct taxes that are subject to the Apportionment Clause. Since the
Pollock decisions were never overruled, a plurality of scholars agrees
that an unapportioned wealth tax is unconstitutional.'o However, this
Article proposes an apportioned wealth tax that is nonetheless fair
and uniform. How is it possible to levy a straight, say 10%, wealth tax
on each taxpayer irrespective of state populations and still comply
with the Apportionment Clause? To date, that question has gone
unanswered. However, this Article proposes to untie the Gordian
knot through a revenue sharing arrangement between the federal and
state governments that is reminiscent of the pre-EGTRRA"l credit
for state death taxes under Code § 2011. Under that section,
taxpayers were entitled to a dollar-for-dollar federal estate tax credit
for any state death taxes they paid.1 62 As a result, states were able to
levy "pick up" death taxes up to the maximum amount of the credit
without increasing the total federal and state tax burden of their
citizens.16 The federal government was effectively sharing the
proceeds of the federal estate tax with state governments.
In like manner, this Article proposes a federal wealth tax that is
initially collected without regard to state populations (e.g., a wealth
tax of 10% on net worth), but to the extent that a state is found to
have contributed more than its apportioned share of the total tax, that
excess shall be refunded. However, this methodology raises two
questions. First, what is a state's apportioned share of the total tax?
Second, how does this system differ from traditional apportionment
such that it complies with notions of tax justice?
158. In fact, congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in
response to Pollock so that it could directly tax income without apportionment.
159. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895).
160. See Schenk, supra note 46, at 475 n.95
161. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836, 107th
Cong. (2001).
162. See 26 U.S.C. § 2011.
163. 26 U.S.C. § 2011(f) provides that the credit "shall not apply to the estates of
decedents dying after December 31, 2004." For the time being, there is no credit for state
death taxes. Instead, there is an unlimited deduction for state death taxes under 26 U.S.C.
§ 2058.
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Traditionally, in a requisition system, the total tax was a known
quantity. The federal government would decide how much revenue
was needed and order the states to pay that amount. Once the
requisition was set, each state's apportioned share was calculated by
multiplying the percentage of the population that lived within its
borders by the total requisition tax:
A=P% xT
where A is the apportioned share, P% is the percentage of the
population that lives within the relevant state, and T is the total
requisition tax set to raised from the states. For example, if the
federal government resolved to raise $10 trillion dollars from the
various states, and 10% of the population lived in Ohio, then Ohio
citizens would be collectively responsible for paying one-tenth of that
amount or $1 trillion.'"
Under this Article's proposal, the total tax is not a known
quantity. Instead, the tax rate is the known quantity and the equation
must be solved to learn the apportioned and unapportioned share of
the wealth tax. This methodology can be illustrated through four
distinct steps: (1) calculate the total wealth tax in each state; (2)
calculate the wealth tax per capita in each state; (3) determine the
lowest wealth tax per capita of any state and multiply it by the
population of each state to determine the apportioned share of the
wealth tax; and (4) return the excess unapportioned share via
taxpayer refund or a state-level pick up tax.
1. Calculate the Total Wealth Tax
First, the wealth tax is applied, quite directly in both economic
and constitutional terms, to the individual taxpayer. Everyone pays a
straight 10% tax on their net worth irrespective of the state in which
they live:
T=RxW
where T is the wealth tax, R is the tax rate (here, 10%), and W is the
taxpayer's wealth or net worth. The equation is applied in precisely
the same manner at the state level. The wealth tax due from the
citizenry of any state would equal 10% of their collective net worth.
For example, if the net worth of Ohio residents were calculated to be
$1 trillion, then the tax due from them would equal one-tenth of that
amount or $100 billion.
164. $1 trillion = 10% x $10 trillion.
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If we were to stop here, this wealth tax would be horizontally
equitable, in that, the citizens of every state would pay a uniform 10%
wealth tax. However, it would certainly violate the Apportionment
Clause and thus fail to pass constitutional muster. Hence, step two.
2. Calculate the Wealth Tax Per Capita for Each State
Next we would compare the amount of wealth tax raised from
the various states to determine which state had the lowest amount of
wealth tax per capita. The wealth tax per capita is calculated by
taking the dollar amount of wealth tax raised in step one and dividing
it by the total population of the state:
WTpC= T/P
where WTpC is the wealth tax per capita, T is the tax initially
collected from the state, and P is the state population. For example, if
our hypothetical Ohio had 10 million citizens, then its wealth tax per
capita or per person would be $10,000.'
3. Calculate Each State's Apportioned Share of the Wealth Tax
Once the WTpC is calculated for each and every state, and the
lowest WTpC is determined, the apportioned share for each state is
calculated by multiplying the lowest WTpC by their respective
populations:
A = WTpC x P
where A is the apportioned share, WTpCL is the lowest wealth tax per
capita of any state, and P is the state population. For example, if our
hypothetical Ohio had the lowest wealth tax per capita, then the
apportioned share for every other state is calculated by multiplying
$10,000 by their respective populations. If New Hampshire had 1
million citizens, then its apportioned share would be $10 billion.'" If
California had 20 million citizens, then its apportioned share would
be $200 billion,"' etc. This methodology allows for the highest
possible apportioned share of tax.
165. $1,000 = $100 billion / 10 million.
166. $10 billion = $10,000 x 1 million.
167. $200 billion = $10,000 x 20 million.
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4. Return the Unapportioned Wealth Tax
a. Refund the Unapportioned Share to Taxpayers
Once the apportioned share is determined for each state, the
excess of the initial wealth tax collected over the apportioned share
must be refunded to comply with the Apportionment Clause. As a
matter of fairness, if the tax is in fact refunded, it should be refunded
to taxpayers in proportion to the amount of tax they paid. For
example, if California raised $300 billion with its initial wealth tax,
but its apportioned share is only $200 billion, it must refund $100
billion to its citizenry. If a taxpayer, say Bill Gates, paid $30 billion or
10% of the initial wealth tax, then $10 billion or 10% of the excess
should be refunded to him.
If we were to stop here, this wealth tax now complies with the
Apportionment Clause and passes constitutional muster, .but it is no
longer horizontally equitable. Citizens of different states are subject
to different effective wealth tax rates. In particular, states with
comparatively smaller and wealthier populations are undertaxed and
those with larger and poorer populations are overburdened-an
absurdly unfair result.
b. Allow or "Encourage" a State Level "Pick Up" Wealth Tax
However, under this Article's proposal, states would be allowed
(or perhaps encouraged6) to levy a "pick up" wealth tax to claim the
excess. In this case, the excess wealth tax collected by each state is
paid into that state's treasury instead of being refunded
proportionally to the taxpayers. Assuming that every state enacted a
"pick up" wealth tax, the end result would be a federal wealth tax that
is apportioned equally among the states, but a total federal and state
wealth tax system that applies with equal force to the citizens of every
state. This approach is not only horizontally equitable as between
taxpayers in different states, but it complies with the letter and spirit
of the Apportionment Clause. It complies with the letter of the law,
168. Although most states would need little coaxing to claim millions or billions in
additional tax revenue, it is at least arguably constitutional for the federal government to
condition the receipt of other funds on the enactment of a "pick up" wealth tax. Much
like the federal government encouraged states to adopt a uniform minimum drinking age
by conditioning the receipt of highway funds on the same, it could "encourage" states to
participate in a national wealth tax scheme by conditioning other funds on their
cooperation. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
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because each state pays no more than its apportioned share to the
federal government. In addition, this approach complies with the
spirit of the law because no state is enriched at another's expense.
Although wealth is redistributed among citizens, there is no
redistribution whatsoever among the states.
Moreover, this approach should succeed where prior proposals
fall on shaky ground. First, one need not read the Apportionment
Clause out of the Constitution for it to work. As noted above, the
constitutional wealth tax fully complies with the Apportionment
Clause."' Second, the related substance-over-form and "step
transaction" doctrines are not implicated. Unlike the federal
government, state governments are not subject to the Apportionment
Clause. Indeed, some of the states-rights Federalists supported the
Apportionment Clause, in part, to preserve direct taxes as the
primary domain of the states.' Thus, there is no realistic concern
that federal and state "pick up" wealth taxes would be collapsed as
one through the substance-over-form or step transaction doctrines.
There is nothing unconstitutional or untoward about a state leveling
direct taxes without apportionment; the states have done so
throughout history and they continue to do so through various
property taxes.
IV. The New Flat Tax
A. Description
This Article proposes the New Flat Tax to raise revenue without
the regressive impact of adopting a consumption tax or hiking the
income tax. Simply put, the New Flat Tax is an annual wealth tax
169. In fact, it could be said that this Article's wealth tax proposal not only complies
with the Apportionment Clause, but is constitutional in the broadest sense of the word. It
is legal, in that, the Supreme Court is likely to uphold it. It also more than arguably
complies with our society's norms and sense of fairness in the tax laws. See James G.
Wilson, The Unconstitutionality of Eliminating Estate and Gift Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
771, 772 (2000) (arguing that eliminating the federal estate tax would be constitutional in
the legal sense, but unconstitutional in the broader, normative sense of violating our
society's "unwritten 'constitutional conventions"').
170. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 855 (2009) ("direct taxation was
expected to be the rare federal practice rather than the norm; in addition,
apportionment-as an acknowledgment of the role of states-would serve the cause of
ratification.").
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with a flat rate equal to the estimated risk free rate of return'
imposed on the excess of a taxpayer's net worth over the inflation-
adjusted exemption equivalent for the estate tax under § 2001. The
estimated risk free rate of return would equal the average, long-term
applicable federal rate (AFR) for the tax year at issue.'72 The New
Flat Tax is expressed as the following equation:
NFT = (NW - EE) x AFR
where NFT is the amount of the New Flat Tax due and payable, NW
is the taxpayer's net worth, EE is the inflation-adjusted exemption
equivalent, and AFR is the average AFR for the tax year.
For example, if the taxpayer has a net worth of $6,340,000 in
2014 when the inflation-adjusted exemption equivalent is set at
$5,340,000 and the average, long-term AFR is 3%, then the taxpayer
would be assessed $30,000 under the New Flat Tax:
$30,000 = ($6,340,000 - $5,340,000) x 3%
It is impossible to determine the exact revenue impact of the
New Flat Tax prior to implementation. However, conservatively
speaking, it would raise hundreds of billions of dollars each tax year."'
171. This Article adopts the risk-free rate of return proposed by Professors Deborah
Schenk and Joseph Dodge, which accords with the low rate of 2% proposed by Professors
Anne Alstott and Bruce Ackerman. See generally Schenk, supra note 46; Dodge, supra
note 78, at 760-68; BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER
SOCIETY (1999). A wealth tax keyed to the risk-free rate of return discourages parking
wealth unproductively. See, e.g., The Parable of the Bags of Gold, Matthew 25:14-30. But
see Richard Lavoie, Dreaming the Impossible Dream: Is a Wealth Tax Now Possible in
America? (Univ. of Akron Legal Stud., Paper No. 14-01, 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2402978. Professor Richard Lavoie has proposed
an "equality tax" that is designed to do more than raise revenue and discourage the
unproductive use of assets. Id. Like the wealth transfer taxes, Professor Lavoie proposes
using the wealth tax to break up intergenerational concentrations of wealth by applying a
rate that substantially exceeds the risk free rate of return. Id. Specifically, he proposes a
progressive wealth tax with a top rate of 10%. Id.
172. The various AFRs are oft used as proxies for the risk-free rate of return, under
the theory that the U.S. Department of the Treasury is the most secure of all creditors and
presents little to no risk of default.
173. Estimates of the total preexisting wealth of the United States vary considerably.
The United Nations estimates the total wealth of the United States at nearly $118 trillion,
whereas John Rutledge estimates the total wealth at $200 trillion using the Flow of Funds
statistics from the Federal Reserve Board. See John Rutledge, Total Assets of the U.S.
Economy $188 Trillion, 13.4xGDP, available at http://rutledgecapital.com/2009/05/24/total-
assets-of-the-us-economy-188-trillion-134xgdp/; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Dec.
29, 2013, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/Current/. Given that most
estimates place more than one third of the total wealth of the United States in the hands
of the top 1%, we can assume a tax base of tens of trillions of dollars. See Edward N.
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If the United Nations is correct in their claim that the total wealth of
the United States is nearly $118 trillion, and the top 1% possess
approximately one-third of that wealth, then a 3% annual wealth tax
would raise over half a trillion dollars a year-even if half of the tax
114base was ultimately exempt.
B. Why Dub a Wealth Tax a Flat Tax?
"Therefore I repeat, let no Man talk to me of these and the like
Expedients, till he hath at least a Glimpse of Hope, that there will
ever be some hearty and sincere attempt to put them into Practice."1 5
Stated otherwise, there is little point in discussing the politically
implausible, and none in discussing the impossible.
Although the term "flat tax" is strongly associated with "a
particular form of consumption-based direct tax,",16 a flat tax is not
necessarily a consumption tax. A flat tax is simply a proportional tax,
which is defined as "a tax in which the tax rate remains constant
regardless of the amount of the tax base."'7  Thus, any tax with a flat
rate, i.e., a constant marginal rate, is accurately referred to as a flat
tax.
Particularly in conservative circles, so-called "fair" or flat taxes
have achieved popularity as a supposedly simpler and fairer
alternative to the income tax. Nearly half of the Republican
presidential candidates in 2012, including the Libertarian hero and
Austrian economist Ron Paul, proposed flat taxes as part of their
platform. Although these flat taxes were all a variety of consumption
taxation, it appears that their popularity is tied to simplicity, not
consumption taxation. Dubbing an annual, flat rate wealth tax as the
New Flat Tax plugs into that popularity and increases the possibility
of bipartisan appeal. Liberals should find the progressivity of the
Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the
Middle-Class Squeeze-an Update to 2007 (Levy Economics Institute of Bard College,
Working Paper No. 589), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf at 44
(showing that the net worth of the wealthiest 1% of Americans represents 34.6% of the
total wealth of the United States in 2007 using data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances conducted by the Federal Reserve Board).
174. $118 trillion x 1/3 = $39.33 trillion x 1/2 = 19.67 trillion x 3% = $590 billion
175. SWIFT, supra note 1.
176. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the Flat Tax: Is It Unique?, 14 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 283 (1997).
177. Flat Tax, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
flat%20tax (last visited Feb. 4, 2014); Proportional Tax, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/proportional+tax?show=0&t =1374071755 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2014).
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New Flat Tax appealing, whereas conservatives are likely to
appreciate the simplicity of administrating a tax that applies a single
rate with one exemption to a handful of taxpayers.
As laid out above, a wealth tax is not only pragmatic and fair, but
viable as a constitutional matter. However, the fact that a wealth tax
is constitutional does not mean it is politically possible. By way of
example, it is certainly constitutional to hike the top marginal federal
income tax rate to 94%." However, given the rancorous debate over
raising that same rate from 35% to 39.6% in 2012, it is all but
politically impossible to do so. Constitutional law and politics are two
very different worlds, and a wealth tax proposal is only relevant if it
has a chance of becoming law. Of course, the nation's heightened
need for revenue does increase the likelihood that Congress will
seriously consider a new form of taxation. However, the question of
whether Congress will consider a wealth tax vis-A-vis a consumption
or income tax depends on public perception. That is why this Article
proposes dubbing wealth taxation as the New Flat Tax. By labeling a
wealth tax as a flat tax, it piggybacks off of the popular sentiment that
libertarians and conservatives have built for flat consumption taxes.
Packaged correctly, a constitutional wealth tax could plausibly be a
popular wealth tax.
Conclusion
Prior to the credit crisis and the recession that followed, the
federal government already experienced multibillion dollar deficits.
In the wake of those events, the billions became trillions. Lest the
trillions become quadrillions,"' googolplexes or some other far-
fetched number, something must be done. Just as there are only two,
rather unpleasant ways to lose weight, diet or exercise, there are only
two ways to balance the budget, spending cuts or revenue increases.
178. "The highpoint in marginal rates was 1944 and 1945, with the top rate at 94% for
Taxable Income exceeding $200,000 (nearly $2.6 million in 2013 dollars)." GEIER, supra
note 25, at 58.
179. A quadrillion is a thousand trillion. Lest the number quadrillion seem fanciful
with respect to the national debt, it should be noted that Japan's debt exceeded $1
quadrillion yen for the first time in 2013. Charles Riley, Japan debt tops 1 quadrillion yen,
CNNMONEY (Aug. 9, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/09/news/economy/japan-debt-
quadrillionlindex.html. It is doubtful that China, Paypal, or anyone else can pay off our
national debt, although accidents do happen. See Sho Wills, Paypal accidently credits man
$92 quadrillion, CNN (July 17, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/17/tech/paypal-
error/index.html?hpt=hpjt2 (Paypal accidentally credits Pennsylvania PR executive's
account with over $92 quadrillion dollars, making him "the richest man in the world by a
long shot.").
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To continue the analogy, dieting can only be taken so far. Anorexia
and Bulimia are neither healthy nor sustainable. Likewise, spending
cuts alone are not enough to balance the budget. So long as taxpayers
continue to demand our military-industrial complex and social
welfare state, revenue increases are also necessary.
Given that reality, we have three realistic alternatives: (1) pass a
consumption tax, (2) hike the income tax, or (3) pass a wealth tax on
less than 1% of the population. Two of the three are unpalatable.
Consumption taxes are somewhat of a cause c6l6bre in both liberal
and conservative circles." However, they are inherently regressive
and disproportionately affect the poor and middle class. Moreover,
the current federal income tax system has many consumption tax
features. Thanks to the realization principle and the step-up in basis
rule of § 1014, wealthy taxpayers can and do defer or altogether avoid
the income tax on their capital income. As a result, hiking the facially
progressive income tax is little better than passing a new consumption
tax. That leaves us with door number three-pass a wealth tax.
Wealth taxes are fair: They measure the totality of a taxpayer's
economic position, societal benefits, and ability to pay. Wealth taxes
are also pragmatic: History has shown them to be administrable, and
due to their broad tax base, they are capable of raising the most
revenue at the lowest and least oppressive rates.
For some time, scholars have debated ways to skirt the
constitutional rule of Apportionment to pass a wealth tax. For the
first time, this Article demonstrates how a wealth tax can comply with
the dual strictures of horizontal equity and Apportionment. Under
this Article's modest proposal, the federal government would collect
a wealth tax at a uniform rate and retain each state's constitutionally
apportioned share of the tax. The excess unapportioned share, if any,
would be refunded to the state of origin by means of a state-level
"pick up" tax. Thus, a wealth tax is not only fair and pragmatic-it is
also constitutional.
But is a wealth tax politically possible? Passing a law that
complies with the Apportionment Clause is certainly more plausible
than amending the Constitution to allow for unapportioned wealth
180. Like the Devil, regressive consumption taxes go by many names. Many liberals
support a European-style VAT as a permanent revenue source "to fund a robust,
compassionate government." N. Gregory Mankiw, Much to Love, and Hate, in a VAT,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/business/02view.html. On
the other hand, many conservatives support a "flat tax" on sales as a simpler alternative to
the income tax. Id. Although they go by different names, the VAT and the flat tax are
both consumption taxes, and they are both regressive. See id.
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taxes."' In today's political climate, however, building a coalition that
constitutes a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and sixty
votes in the U.S. Senate is no small task."2 That is precisely why this
Article proposes redubbing wealth taxation as the New Flat Tax. In
taking on the mantle of simplicity implied by the term "flat tax," a
wealth tax just might achieve the level of popularity necessary to pass
the halls of Congress. Moreover, the New Flat Tax is legitimately
deserving of that mantle. What could be simpler than a flat tax with a
single rate and a single exemption that applies to less than 1% of all
taxpayers? Forget the so-called "postcard return" under the Hall and
Rabushka flat consumption tax." Under the New Flat Tax, the
supermajority of taxpayers need file no return at all. Stated
otherwise, a simple wealth tax that is marketed for its simplicity is
simply more likely to pass.
181. However, the Sixteenth Amendment was successfully adopted for purposes of
levying an unapportioned federal income tax.
182. Even this scenario assumes no presidential veto, which would require a two-
thirds majority of Congress for passage.
183. See Ronald McKinnon, The Conservative Case for a Wealth Tax, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 9, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702034623045771392328813
46686.html.
184. See generally ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed.
1995) (advocating to replace the FORM 1040 - U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN
with a shorter, postcard-length return).
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